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INTRODUCTION 
This conference, celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the 
Feminism and Legal Theory Project, presents a welcome opportunity 
to reflect on prior work and consider new directions.  This essay will 
first discuss why it is important for feminists to focus on torts as a field.  
                                                          
* Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; Visiting Professor, Boston 
University School of Law; Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School.  Many thanks to the 
editors and staff of the American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the 
Law and to the organizers of the Twentieth Anniversary Celebration of the Feminism 
& Legal Theory Project.  I am grateful to Joshua Scott and David Goldberg for 
excellent research assistance, to Deborah Tuerkheimer for reviewing drafts, and to 
George Chauncey, Martha Fineman, Sally Goldfarb, Julie Goldscheid, Quince 
Hopkins, and Liz Schneider for useful comments. 
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Second, the essay will outline some broad approaches that feminist 
legal theory can take.  The approaches outlined here are 
acknowledging context and “asking the woman question[s].”1  Third, 
I will apply these approaches to various aspects of torts.  This leads to 
suggestions for changes in the ways we think about torts, as well as in 
some statutes that relate to torts. 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF TORTS FOR FEMINISTS 
Feminist legal writers have directed little attention to tort law, 
compared with family law, criminal law, and constitutional law.  This 
lack of emphasis is unfortunate, since tort law deserves attention for 
many reasons. 
Torts is a key mechanism of compensation for, and deterrence of, 
injury in the United States.2  Torts has important normative and 
narrative roles.  Prosser and Keeton famously claimed, “[p]erhaps 
more than any other branch of the law, the law of torts is a 
battleground for social theory.”3  Tort law is concerned with a wide 
range of individual injury and recognizes a wide range of harms, from 
emotional harm, to dignitary harm, to physical harm. 
Tort law has dealt, at times, in a more nuanced way than many 
might expect with issues of gender difference.4  Torts has a flexible 
methodology, namely common law adjudication.  Torts has a 
decentralized, egalitarian decision-making system—the jury (for cases 
that get that far).5  The torts enforcement mechanism depends only 
                                                          
 1. Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 836-37 
(1990) (defining “asking the woman question” as a technique that identifies and 
examines elements of existing legal doctrine that overlook disadvantaged women).  
See generally Regina Austin, “Bad for Business”: Contextual Analysis, Race 
Discrimination, and Fast Food, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 207 (2000) (stressing the 
importance of context in evaluating racial stereotypes in economic transactions and 
giving racial discrimination within the fast food industry as an example); Regina 
Austin, Of False Teeth and Biting Critiques: Jones v. Fisher in Context, 15 TOURO L. 
REV. 389 (1999) (stressing the significance of context in evaluating law); Leslie 
Bender, Teaching Torts as if Gender Matters: Intentional Torts, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & 
L. 115, 118-21 (1994) (suggesting ways to frame questions to analyze the extent of 
gender bias in torts casebooks and course materials). 
 2. See David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and 
Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 395 (2000) (stating that tort law’s major 
goals are inducing effective and efficient deterrence and compensation). 
 3. THE LAW OF TORTS 15 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984). 
 4. See Margo Schlanger, Injured Women Before Common Law Courts, 1860-
1930, 21 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 79, 86-87 (1998) (using three categories of cases to 
analyze tort law’s intricate interaction with gender difference: 1) women injured as 
passengers in cars and wagons; 2) women injured as drivers of wagons; and 3) women 
injured boarding and disembarking from trains).  See generally BARBARA YOUNG 
WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW, AND THE RAILROAD 
REVOLUTION 1865-1920 (2001) (analyzing lawsuits against the railroads and their 
results in terms of race and gender). 
 5. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624-25 (1991) 
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indirectly on the state, since enforcement is through private lawyers 
bringing contingency fee cases.6  This system has limitations.  For 
instance, tort litigation generally is not pursued when the defendant 
lacks attainable assets or liability insurance.  This system also has 
strengths.  For example, during the period shortly after the end of 
slavery and through the end of Jim Crow, black women and men 
sometimes were able to find lawyers to successfully sue railroads and 
other defendants for their physical and dignitary injuries.7  These 
plaintiffs rarely would have been able to hire a lawyer on an hourly 
basis.  Their successful lawsuits held railroads and other defendants 
responsible for their actions in ways that the state would not have 
done during this era.8  Tort law, if effectively enforced, would provide 
compensation for harms such as those recognized in the now-defunct 
civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act; indeed, 
almost all cases brought under that provision also included 
intentional tort claims.9 
Although tort law does not talk much about equality or 
discrimination, it does talk about changing behavior, injury, and 
harms, all central feminist concerns.  All of these aspects make tort 
law an interesting area for study and reform.  Individual self-
                                                          
(discussing the role of the jury as the “principal fact-finder, charged with weighing 
the evidence, judging the credibility of witnesses, and reaching a verdict”); Powers v. 
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (stating that “[j]ury service preserves the democratic 
element of the law, as it guards the rights of the parties and ensures continued 
acceptance of the laws by all the people”). 
 6. This is not to suggest that the state is uninvolved in the torts system.  See, e.g., 
Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific 
Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 
73, 74 (1994) (arguing that courts’ admission into evidence of race-specific and 
gender-specific economic data in torts cases is unconstitutional state action). 
 7. See, e.g., Fla. E. Coast Ry. v. Geiger, 64 So. 238, 240 (Fla. 1914) (upholding a 
second jury award for damages awarded to a “colored” man injured while getting off 
and back onto a train); Fla. E. Coast Ry. v. Geiger, 60 So. 753, 757 (Fla. 1913) 
(reversing a jury verdict for a black plaintiff); Wilson v. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 
113 S.E. 508, 510 (N.C. 1922) (upholding a jury verdict for a “colored woman” for 
assault and trespass by Singer’s agent).  See generally WELKE, supra note 4 (analyzing 
lawsuits against the railroads and their results in terms of race and gender).  See, e.g, 
Jennifer Wriggins, The Color of Injury: Race, Gender, and Torts in the First Half of 
the Twentieth Century (2004) [hereinafter Wriggins, The Color of Injury] (work in 
progress, on file with author) (showing that, despite the mechanisms of exclusion 
from participation in virtually all aspects of the legal system, blacks brought and won 
tort lawsuits throughout the first half of the twentieth century). 
 8. See WELKE, supra note 4, at 323-75 (outlining judicial decisions that applied 
the common law, rather than state or federal laws, to require equal treatment of 
passengers by common carriers). 
 9. See Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 134 
n.64 (2001) [hereinafter Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts] (noting that the 
majority of the seventy-three reported cases brought under the Violence Against 
Women Act included intentional tort claims). 
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determination and autonomy are important assumptions in torts,10 
and in that sense tort law is inadequate to those who believe that law 
should not reflect such assumptions.11 
II. GENERAL APPROACHES 
This essay discusses some of what feminist perspectives can provide 
in connection with torts.12  Very broadly, feminist legal theory looks at 
pertinent aspects of torts through a lens that pays attention to gender 
and race.13  One of the projects of feminist legal theory is to explore 
and acknowledge the contexts in which law operates.  A second aspect 
of feminist legal theory’s work is to ask questions about how law 
affects women in their diversity.  Third, feminist legal theory can, 
through acknowledging context and asking questions about how law 
affects women and others, develop ideas for legal reform.  The last 
twenty years of feminist legal thinking and theorizing have taught us 
that law and its workings are very complex.  Broad-brush analyses of 
the tort system as “male,” have turned out to be too simplistic.  More 
nuanced understandings may lead to creative changes. 
Torts scholarship and teaching sometimes assume that an 
acontextual approach to reading cases is sufficient for understanding 
torts.  In reading appellate decisions, the fodder of torts courses and 
much of torts scholarship, we learn nothing about the parties except 
                                                          
 10. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 556 (Okla. 1979) (noting that 
“Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thoroughgoing self-determination, 
each man considered to be his own master”). 
 11. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF 
DEPENDENCY 28-30 (2004) (arguing that current legal and social systems create false 
images of autonomy and mask genuine subsidies, and should be replaced by a system 
which more equitably distributes responsibility for dependency). 
 12. I am using “feminist perspectives” generally to refer to the techniques of 
acknowledging context and asking the woman questions.  See supra note 1 and 
accompanying text.  This is not meant to exhaust the term “feminist perspectives.”  
Nor is it meant to suggest that these techniques are exclusively the province of 
feminists.  Obviously, as much scholarship has discussed, the category of “women” is 
not monolithic, and equally obviously the technique of contextualizing need not be 
limited to women’s concerns.  See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 1241, 1296-99 (1991) (exploring the race and gender dimensions of violence 
against women of color by focusing on battering and rape, the way in which 
experiences of women of color are frequently the product of intersecting patterns of 
racism and sexism, and how these experiences tend not to be represented within the 
feminist or antiracist discourse); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the 
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination 
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 160-67 
(1989) (arguing that black women are sometimes excluded from feminist theory and 
antiracist policy discourse because both are predicated on a discrete set of 
experiences that often does not accurately reflect the interaction of race and gender). 
 13. Part III.A of this essay is part of a larger project examining the roles of race 
and gender in tort law during the first half of the twentieth century.  See generally 
Wriggins, The Color of Injury, supra note 7. 
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what is in the opinion.  The parties’ genders may be mentioned but 
are rarely considered significant, while the parties’ races are generally 
not discussed at all.  Gender and race, the dominant view seems to be, 
do not matter and never have mattered.  This essay challenges that 
assumption. 
The next section of this essay, which applies tools of feminist legal 
theory to torts, has two main parts.  First, it explores two appellate tort 
cases that highlight issues of gender and race in ways bearing on 
classic torts issues of damages and liability.14  Acknowledging the 
context of gender and race leads to the observation that torts cases, by 
their determinations of liability and damages, both reinforce and 
challenge racial and gender hierarchies.  Asking the woman questions 
with race in mind in connection with these cases leads to a focus on 
how tort cases have endorsed or challenged racist traditions of 
“protecting” white women from blacks, particularly black men.  
Second, this essay examines the almost total absence of domestic 
violence from the torts lexicon, despite its obviously tortious nature. 
“Asking the woman questions” in the context of torts leads to a focus 
on domestic violence.  Focusing on domestic violence as a torts issue, 
this essay presents an argument for mandatory insurance covering 
injuries from domestic violence. 
III. APPLICATIONS 
A. Injury, Liability, Gender, and Race 
1. Recognizing Status Injury to White Women: Gulf, Colorado & Santa 
Fe Railway v. Luther 
The field of torts mushroomed in the early twentieth century in the 
                                                          
 14. The cases discussed here do not discuss the meaning of race.  Discussion of 
the complex litigation and issues involving racial identity and status is beyond the 
scope of this essay.  See generally John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie 
Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural 
World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2160 (1992) (arguing that “race” is a term without a 
fixed meaning); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination 
in the Nineteenth Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 118 (1998) (analyzing trials of 
racial determination to suggest “a more complex interplay between legal and cultural 
meanings of race” evidenced through trial testimony going beyond ancestry to 
ordinary people’s understanding of race and their place in the racial hierarchy); 
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1714 (1993) 
(investigating the relationship between the concepts of race and property and 
showing that rights in property are contingent upon race); Peggy Pascoe, 
Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of “Race” in Twentieth-Century 
America, 83 J. AM. HIST. 44, 46 (1996) (noting that although many think they know 
what “race” means, it is difficult to define and has various meanings depending on 
context). 
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wake of the myriad of injuries associated with industrialization.15  
Negligence law, it is commonly said, evolved to deal with those 
injuries.16  These injuries involved harm inflicted in public places by 
mechanisms of industrialization, such as railroads.17  Law involving 
railroads often turned on the duties of “common carriers,” which 
varied from state to state and which originated in the duties of inns 
and other private institutions that had important public functions.18  
Race and gender play major roles in some of these opinions. 
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway v. Luther was a 1905 Texas 
appellate court decision in which the husband of a white woman sued 
a railroad carrier for his wife’s emotional damages allegedly suffered 
as a result of an insult by a “negro woman” who was employed by the 
railroad as an attendant in the “ladies’ waiting room.”19  The decision 
upheld the then large sum of $2,500 awarded by the jury against the 
railroad.20  The “negro woman” was never named.  Larger railway 
stations during Jim Crow had a colored waiting room, a white waiting 
room, and a separate waiting room for white women.21 
The facts, as described by Mrs. Luther, were that while she was in 
the ladies’ waiting room with her four children, one of her children 
spilled a glass of water.22  When Mrs. Luther told “the negro woman” 
that the child did not know water was in the cup: 
[S]he turned on me with an angry look, and said, “the child did 
know water was in the cup” . . . .  Then she said to me, “If you say 
                                                          
 15. See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
16 (2003) (describing the evolution of negligence in tort law); JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE 
ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING 
OF AMERICAN LAW 8, 59 (2004) (describing the evolution of accident law). 
 16. See WHITE, supra note 15, at 16 (discussing how tort law developed to 
accommodate new injuries and duties associated with advancements in 
transportation, mills, dams, carriages, and ships). 
 17. See id. at 16-17 (illustrating the then-new concept of negligence in Brown v. 
Collins, 53 N.H. 442 (N.H. 1873), where a passing train startled horses that then 
damaged private property). 
 18. See WELKE, supra note 4, at 324-25 (explaining the evolution of the common 
law for common carriers and describing nineteenth century common carriers as 
privately owned companies that served the public by transporting people from one 
place to another). 
 19. 90 S.W. 44, 45 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905). 
 20. Id. at 45. 
 21. See WELKE, supra note 4, at 276-77 (showing and describing the floor plan of 
larger train stations).  The many issues involved with Jim Crow public transportation, 
which of course was famously upheld in Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), are 
beyond the scope of this essay.  See generally CATHERINE A. BARNES, JOURNEY FROM JIM 
CROW: THE DESEGREGATION OF SOUTHERN TRANSIT (1983) (examining the struggle to 
end segregation in Southern transportation); WELKE, supra note 4, at 323-75 
(discussing the law of racial segregation). 
 22. See Luther, 90 S.W. at 46 (accepting the exact testimony of Mrs. Luther, while 
omitting all testimony of the black attendant). 
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the child did not know that the water was in the cup you are a liar.”  
I then said to her, “I have not been accustomed to be treated this 
way by colored people.”  She then replied: “I am used to your kind.  
I meet up with them every day.”  During the conversation she was 
standing right over me, shaking her finger right in my face, and 
looking vicious and angry.  She stood over me about five minutes, 
and said many things to me that I cannot remember, as I was very 
much frightened at the time.23 
The part of the decision on appeal that is material here dealt with 
the duties of common carriers to protect passengers from “violence 
and insult from whatsoever source arising.”24  Even though Mrs. 
Luther did not sustain any physical injury, her mental suffering was 
deemed compensable because the injury resulted from the common 
carrier’s breach of duty.25  The “negro woman” testified differently, 
but the jury believed Mrs. Luther’s testimony which, according to the 
appellate court, was “corroborated by other circumstances” not 
specified.26 
This case presents fascinating gender and race issues that eclipse 
the commonplace doctrinal issues.  Doctrinally, given the broad 
duties of common carriers, it is likely that Mr. Luther would have 
recovered some amount had the waiting room attendant been 
white.27  A plaintiff suing a railroad for an employee’s insult did not 
have to prove that the employee actually committed a tort such as 
assault before prevailing against the railroad for an injury.28 
However, gender and race play critical roles in the case in at least 
the following four ways.  First, the plaintiff was in the ladies’ waiting 
room.29  This type of waiting room, common in the early twentieth 
                                                          
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. (accepting the jury’s findings of fact as true without further explanation). 
 27. See THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 3, at 57-58 (stating, 
[t]he earliest appearance of anything like a separate cause of action for the 
intentional infliction of mental suffering was in cases holding a common 
carrier liable for insulting a passenger. . . .  [The] decisions rest the liability 
upon the special obligation of the carrier to the public. . . .  [I]n this field the 
decisions have gone to considerable lengths [to impose liability]). 
 28. See id. (explaining that cases holding common carriers liable for insults to 
passengers by employees were the beginning of the creation of a separate cause of 
action for intentional infliction of mental suffering); see also Haile v. New Orleans 
Ry. & Light Co., 65 So. 225, 225-26 (La. 1914) (holding the streetcar company liable 
for an employee’s statement to a passenger that she was a “big fat woman”); Lipman v. 
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 93. S.E. 714, 714 (S.C. 1917) (reversing the dismissal of a 
claim wherein a railroad employee called a passenger a lunatic, told him he belonged 
in a lunatic asylum, and that he would have given him two black eyes had he been off 
duty). 
 29. See Luther, 90 S.W. at 46 (explaining that the complainant was waiting with 
her children while her husband attended to business matters). 
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century South, was reserved for white women, their children, and 
white male escorts (generally husbands).30  Trains also had “ladies’ 
cars” reserved for white women, and middle class black women sued 
train companies when denied access to ladies’ spaces on trains.31  
White women and men zealously guarded their racially separate 
spaces.32 
Second, the plaintiff in the lawsuit was Mr. Luther, not Mrs. Luther.  
Mr. Luther sued for injuries to his wife.33  Married women under 
common law, even privileged white women, could not sue in their 
own names for their own injuries.34  However, Texas did not adopt 
the common law rules limiting women’s rights at marriage and 
instead adopted the civil law on marriage from Spain.35  Thus, it 
seems that Mrs. Luther technically could have sued in her own name 
but that cultural factors perhaps prevented this. 
Third, the court’s rhetoric is redolent with paternalistic solicitude 
for the “frail, delicate, sensitive” white woman and her mental injuries 
at the hands of the “threatening negro.”36  The court rhetorically 
asked: 
[W]hat could be more humiliating to a frail, delicate, sensitive 
woman, with a babe at her breast and her other little ones around 
her, than to be pounced upon, vilified, and traduced by a negro 
servant in a railway depot, where her relation as passenger to its 
                                                          
 30. See WELKE, supra note 4, at 276-77. 
 31. See id. at 289-90 (presenting the facts of two cases where black women filed 
suit against railroad companies after they were removed from white-only ladies’ cars). 
 32. See id. at 280-322 (theorizing how white men and women tried to preserve 
their status and the racial hierarchy by maintaining socially defined public spaces, 
such as white and colored sections of the train). 
 33. See Luther, 90 S.W. at 45 (referring to Mrs. Luther throughout the opinion as 
“Mr. Luther’s wife” or the “plaintiff’s wife”). 
 34. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and 
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2161-71 (1996) (determining that the passage of the 
Married Women’s Property Acts modified the common law prohibitions that 
included forbidding wives from suing in their own names, and that these prohibitions 
often were given a narrow construction). 
 35. See, e.g., Dickson v. Strickard, 265 S.W. 1012, 1021 (Tex. 1924) (noting that 
“the old common-law principles invoked against [a female candidate for governor] 
have never been in force in Texas, and certainly are not in force at the present 
time”).  The court in Dickson also noted that Texas adopted civil law on marriage 
from Spain when it adopted the common law in 1840.  Id. at 1022.  See also Barkley v. 
Dunke, 87 S.W. 1147, 1147 (Tex. 1905) (holding common law rules defining putative 
wives not applicable in Texas).  See generally Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First 
Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE 
L.J. 1073, 1081 n.17 (1994) (noting that Louisiana and Texas had community 
property systems during the antebellum period). 
 36. See Luther, 90 S.W. at 48.  See generally Martha Chamallas & Linda K. 
Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 814 
(1990) (arguing that the law of torts has often failed to compensate women for harms 
not commonly alleged by men, such as emotional, fright-based injuries). 
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owner entitles her to be treated with respect and kindness?  Is it any 
wonder to those who can contemplate the effect of such an outrage 
that the poor woman for months afterwards, as she testified, could 
not close her eyes without that angry, threatening negro arising 
before her and murdering sleep.37 
The black attendant’s actions are described as violent, in explicitly 
race-based terms: “to be pounced upon, vilified, and traduced by a 
negro servant in a railway depot.”38  The image of white women as 
acutely sensitive to emotional upset and pain, common in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, is on full display in this 
opinion.39 
Fourth, the harm is constructed based upon the idea that the race 
of the servant and the victim combine to make the victim’s harm 
worse.  In fact, as the court notes, Mrs. Luther could not “close her 
eyes without that angry, threatening negro arising before her and 
murdering sleep.”40  In this last sentence, the gender of the attendant 
is left out, and the court gives us an image of an “angry, threatening 
negro,” 41 which, in theory, could refer to a male or female person.  
However, the term “negro” often referred to black men in particular, 
so this creates a trope of an “angry, threatening negro” man.42  The 
court’s description masculinizes the female attendant.  And this 
“angry, threatening negro” is murdering—sleep!43  The court uses 
stereotypes of black males as criminals threatening white women to 
endorse the significant damages that Mr. Luther won.44  It is more 
humiliating, more upsetting, to be insulted by a black attendant than 
a white, the court’s language implies.  Race and gender determine the 
injury in this case.45  The decision imposed on the railroad a duty to 
                                                          
 37. Luther, 90 S.W. at 48. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See, e.g., WELKE, supra note 4, at 125-36 (describing the stereotype of a 
fragile, acutely sensitive white woman). 
 40. 90 S.W. at 48. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Courts sometimes used the term “negress” to describe a female black woman.  
See, e.g., Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326, 327 (5th Cir. 1959) 
[hereinafter Bullock II] (stating that although the appellant’s wife looked white, she 
was a “Negress”). 
 43. See Luther, 90 S.W. at 48. 
 44. See id. (describing the various things a jury can consider when finding 
damages in the form of mental anguish, such as humiliation, wounded pride, and 
mental suffering). 
 45. I am not suggesting that the case is only about race and gender.  There was 
tremendous anger at the railroads during the height of Jim Crow, such that all-white 
juries sometimes ruled against them in favor of black people’s injury claims.  See 
Barbara Y. Welke, Beyond Plessy: Space, Status, and Race in the Era of Jim Crow, 2000 
UTAH L. REV. 267, 276 (explaining that during the Jim Crow era, there were other 
factors, such as railroad pricing discrimination and terrible train disasters, that led to 
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uphold racial hierarchy, since the court held the railroad liable for 
failing to protect white women from threats to their superior racial 
status. 
2.  Undermining Sexualized Racism through Duty and Liability: 
Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. 
Duty in negligence law depends on foreseeability of risks.46  As 
Justice Cardozo wrote in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., “[t]he 
risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.”47  Duty 
may depend on foreseeability of risk but what a foreseeable risk is can 
depend on how decisionmakers see the social context.  In Bullock v. 
Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., the Fifth Circuit, through its analysis of 
duty and liability, created a challenge to racial and gender 
hierarchies, albeit an equivocal one.48 
The events giving rise to the injury and the lawsuit deserve careful 
attention.  In 1957, Reverend and Mrs. Bullock, a married couple 
from Jamaica, on a bus trip to see the United States, got on a bus in 
Miami and sat in the front.49  “The husband was dark or black, while 
the wife, though a Negress, appeared to be a white woman.”50  A 
white passenger near Miami complained about where Reverend 
Bullock was sitting.51  The driver told Reverend Bullock of the 
complaint and asked him to move to the back of the bus, which he 
did not do.52  Later, after the Bullocks had traveled north to within 
ninety miles of Tallahassee, a white man overheard the driver telling 
someone at a bus stop about the presence of this couple in the front 
of the bus.53  He bought a ticket, got on the bus and assaulted the 
                                                          
a general societal anger at all railroad companies); see also Fla. E. Coast Ry. v. Geiger, 
64 So. 238, 240 (Fla. 1914) (affirming the reversal of a jury verdict that had been 
favorable to the black, injured plaintiff).  See generally WELKE, supra note 4, at 99-100 
(describing society’s growing disdain of the railroads’ overwhelming concern for 
profit and not for human cost). 
 46. See THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 3, at 356 (explaining the intersection of 
duty, obligation, and risk in negligence cases).  The editors note “in negligence cases, 
the duty is always . . . to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in light 
of the apparent risk.”  Id. 
 47. 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 48. See Bullock II, 266 F.2d at 332 (holding a common carrier liable for injuries 
inflicted upon black passengers due to their race). 
 49. See id. at 328. 
 50. Id.  Although the Fifth Circuit was clear that Ms. Bullock was a “Negress,” the 
trial court described her as simply white.  See Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 
162 F. Supp. 203, 204 (N.D. Fla. 1958) (stating the “husband is colored and the wife is 
white”) [hereinafter Bullock I], rev’d, 266 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1959). 
 51. Bullock I, 162 F. Supp. at 204. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 205. 
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Bullocks.54  They later sued the bus company for their injuries.55 
Although the plaintiffs lost at trial, the appellate court ruled in the 
Bullocks’ favor, saying: 
[T]his court will take judicial notice (as the district court should 
have done) of the commonly and generally known fact that the 
folkways prevalent in Taylor County, Florida . . . would cause a 
reasonable man, familiar with local customs, to anticipate that 
violence might result if a Negro man and a seemingly white woman 
should ride into the county seated together toward the front of an 
interurban bus.56 
According to the Fifth Circuit’s analysis, the Bullocks had 
successfully established that the company had a duty to protect them, 
and that the company had breached the duty.57  The case was 
remanded for consideration of damages.58 
The duty of the carrier, then, was specific to that time and place, 
and was specifically based on anticipating racist attacks.59  All of the 
bus company’s witnesses stated that this was the first time they knew of 
a black man and a white woman sitting together on a bus or train in 
that region.60  The attacks should have been anticipated, not simply 
because a black person was sitting in the front of the bus, but because 
the combination of a “Negro man and a seemingly white woman” 
sitting together in the front was obviously incendiary.61  The Fifth 
Circuit recognized this as a risk-creating combination of people, 
space, and circumstances.62  This recognition is perhaps not 
surprising given the historical confluence between race, sex, and 
                                                          
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 204. 
 56. Bullock II, 266 F.2d at 332.  Taylor County, Florida, is a coastal county 
Southeast of Tallahassee.  The major city, Perry, is fifty-one miles from Tallahassee.  
The trial court was located in Tallahassee. 
 57. See id. at 331-32 (ruling that the danger to the Bullocks should have been 
reasonably foreseen by the bus company, giving them time to act to avoid passenger 
injury). 
 58. Id. at 332. 
 59. Id. at 331 (noting that the bus company had issued bulletins in 1953 and 1956 
warning drivers of the possibility of racial disturbances and stating further the 
strength of this case as an example of a situation where the bus drivers and the bus 
company should have anticipated the danger to the Bullocks). 
 60. See, e.g., id. at 332 n.1 (describing the situation through the statements of the 
actual assailant, Milton Poppell, who plainly noted that black people had their own 
place, which was neither sitting in the front of the bus nor marrying a white woman).  
During this time, Florida had a statute prohibiting interracial fornication which was in 
effect until struck down by the Supreme Court in 1964.  See McLaughlin v. Florida, 
379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 61. Id. at 332. 
 62. Id. at 331-32 (stating that the character and infliction of injury in the 
circumstances were reasonably expected). 
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social control that figures so prominently in the context of rape and 
criminal law.63 
By contrast, the trial court ignored the volatile gender-race 
confluence and saw this assault as a fluke, as unforeseeable, and 
therefore something for which the bus company should not be 
liable.64  Bus companies, although common carriers, were not liable 
for unprovoked and illegal assaults by fellow passengers.65  The trial 
court wrote: 
Plaintiffs try to take this case out of the law established in the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Florida cited above by arguing 
that because of the attitude of the South toward integration carriers 
of passengers should anticipate assaults and adopt measures to 
protect passengers therefrom.  The evidence in this case completely 
refutes the contention of plaintiffs in this regard.  Integration in 
transportation has now been in effect in Florida and elsewhere in 
the South for approximately four years and the undisputed 
evidence in this case is to the effect that insofar as the carriers, both 
railway and bus transportation, are concerned, this is the only case 
in which an unprovoked assault of this nature has occurred. . . .   
The colored people, by an overwhelming majority, prefer to be 
segregated and voluntarily segregate themselves on public 
transportation.  The testimony is that it is a rare occasion when a 
colored person, riding on public transportation, insists upon the 
right to sit among white passengers, but where such right is 
asserted, no violence, except in this case, has ever occurred in this 
state or any of its adjoining states.66 
To the trial court, the harm was unforeseeable, and thus the 
company had no duty to prevent it.67 
                                                          
 63. See, e.g., Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 
103, 103-04 (1983) [hereinafter Wriggins, Rape] (arguing that the legal system’s 
treatment of rape has disproportionately targeted black men for punishment and 
made black women both particularly vulnerable and without redress through the 
denial of the reality of women’s sexual subordination by creating a social meaning of 
rape, which implies that the only form of illegal rape involves a black offender and a 
white victim). 
 64. See Bullock I, 162 F. Supp. at 205 (pointing out the rarity of racial violence on 
buses). 
 65. See, e.g., Hall v. Seaboard A.L.R. Co., 93 So. 151, 154 (Fla. 1922) (directing a 
verdict in favor of the railroad in the passenger’s claim for damages for injuries 
sustained while she was riding overnight on the railroad’s train). 
 66. Bullock I, 162 F. Supp. at 205; see BARNES, supra note 21, at ix, 11, 40, 62, 104 
(evidencing that despite the trial court’s views, and despite the fact that few blacks sat 
in the front of the bus immediately after racial segregation of buses was declared 
illegal, segregated public transportation was one of the most hated forms of 
segregation for Southern blacks and was resisted well before and throughout the Jim 
Crow period, with numerous instances of violence against blacks who refused to move 
to the back of the bus). 
 67. See Bullock I, 162 F. Supp. at 205 (stating that the Supreme Court of Florida 
has already settled the issue that the bus company is not liable to the passengers for 
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Both views about duty and foreseeability of risk are dependent on 
opposing empirical conclusions drawn by courts.  The trial judge, 
physically located much closer to the events than the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, stated that black people “voluntarily” segregate 
themselves on buses (presumably at the back), so that this kind of 
situation rarely arises, but claimed that when it has arisen it has never 
led to violence.68  To the Fifth Circuit, this was a situation where 
“mischief was hovering about,” so the bus company had a duty to 
prevent foreseeable harm.69  Duty here is situated in contrasting views 
of risk, race, gender, and social reality. 
The court in Bullock recognized and tried to compensate for injury 
by racists.  The case challenges sexualized racism because it suggests 
that a white woman and a black man should be able to safely sit in the 
front of a bus together.  It spreads the risks and costs of racist injury 
and creates an economic incentive for actors like bus companies to 
prevent racist injury.  On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit’s list of 
“precautions” the company should have taken to prevent the harm 
presents a more limited view of the case’s challenge to racism.70  For 
example, the company should have told the driver to inform visiting 
foreign blacks (like the Bullocks) of the South’s segregation 
traditions, and “should have explained to the Bullocks his reasons for 
wanting them to move.”71  The driver also should not have revealed to 
the assailant “the Bullocks’ position on the bus [or] their apparent 
color and lack of color.”72  These statements raise the following 
question: if the driver had told them his reasons for wanting them to 
move to the back of the bus, but they had refused and gotten 
assaulted by a passenger, could the bus company then argue that their 
stubborn conduct in refusing to move somehow barred recovery on a 
contributory negligence or assumption of risk type theory?  Actually, 
despite these statements about what the company should have done, 
the Fifth Circuit does not take them very literally.  After all, Mr. 
                                                          
the illegal and unprovoked assault by another passenger). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Bullock II, 266 F. 2d at 331. 
 70. See id. at 332 (suggesting various ways in which the bus company should have 
given advice to black passengers wanting to travel in the South). 
 71. Id.  It is not clear where exactly the seemingly white Mrs. Bullock “belonged.”  
The Fifth Circuit suggests the driver should have told the Bullocks why they both 
should move to the back of the bus.  Id.  If she truly was white, she did not “belong” 
in the back of the bus.  The trial court, by contrast, found that only Rev. Bullock was 
asked to move to the back of the bus.  Bullock I, 162 F. Supp. at 204.  Mrs. Bullock 
apparently was treated as white by the driver in that she was not asked to move back.  
Id.  The assailant told them both to move to the back of the bus before assaulting 
both of them.  Id. at 204. 
 72. Bullock II, 266 F. 2d at 332. 
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Bullock was informed of a passenger’s complaint and was asked to 
move, but he had refused.73  He testified that he was aware of 
segregation customs but understood that they had been abolished.74  
He and his wife may have wanted to sit in the front of the bus for a 
variety of reasons, and the Fifth Circuit’s opinion can be read as 
saying that they had a right to do so.  To use the language of torts, the 
common carrier had a duty to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to 
them while seated together in the front of the bus, and if the carrier 
failed to do so, the carrier would be liable for ensuing harm.75 
3.  Conclusion 
“Protecting” white women is central to the decisions in Luther and 
Bullock.  In Luther, the plaintiff’s wife was supposed to be protected 
from men, particularly working class and black men, by being in the 
ladies’ waiting room.  The court portrayed the plaintiff’s wife as a 
helpless female who the railroad failed by letting her be verbally 
attacked by a black person, which caused a traumatic harm to her 
status as a white woman.  In Bullock, the Bullocks were attacked 
because Mrs. Bullock looked white, Mr. Bullock looked black, and 
they were together in the front of the bus.  The Fifth Circuit’s belief 
that “mischief was hovering about” specifically related to the risk that 
white people would act violently on the belief that a white woman 
always needed protection from a black man.  This risk was seen as so 
obvious that the bus company was liable for the racist man’s attack on 
the Bullocks.  Both cases have to do with how white, racial, gender, 
and spatial prerogatives are protected or not.  The white woman’s 
supposed-to-be-safe zone in the Luther train station was protected by 
the imposition of liability and the award of damages, while the front 
of the bus as a zone that white women would never have to share with 
black men was weakened by the imposition of liability in Bullock. 
Luther and Bullock contain complex, important narratives about race 
and gender exemplifying ways that tort concepts like foreseeability 
and injury are embedded in context.76 
                                                          
 73. Bullock I, 162 F. Supp. at 204. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See, e.g., JENNY BOURNE WAHL, THE BONDSMAN’S BURDEN: AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW OF SOUTHERN SLAVERY 88-90 (1998) (arguing that slave 
law was important in the development of the “last clear chance” doctrine and in 
expanding notions of valuing harm to human beings); WELKE, supra note 4 
(discussing race and gender in the context of tort lawsuits against railroads); 
Schlanger, supra note 4, at 85 (concluding that gender difference was and remains 
important in determining the standard of care in accident cases).  Additional work 
will continue this exploration.  See, e.g., Wriggins, The Color of  Injury, supra note 7 
(showing that despite the mechanisms of exclusion from participation in virtually all 
aspects of the legal system, blacks brought and won tort lawsuits throughout the first 
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B. Domestic Violence 
1. Tort Law and Scholarship’s Omission of Domestic Violence 
The feminist practice of “asking the woman question[s]” in the 
context of torts leads to analysis of domestic violence as a torts issue.77  
Tort law and scholarship have largely ignored domestic violence, 
despite the fact that domestic violence is obviously tortious, consisting 
of torts such as assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  These are largely not analyzed as 
tortious harms in contemporary torts scholarship and law  
Acknowledging some theoretical, doctrinal, and economic context 
helps explain why that is so. 
Two main reasons seem to be responsible for the omission.  First, 
since the early twentieth century, the field of torts has been 
conceptualized as pertaining primarily to accidental injury that causes 
harm to strangers—the prototypical tort is physical injury caused by a 
railroad.  Second, there are very few reported tort cases concerning 
domestic violence injuries to even analyze, because of a combination 
of several factors.  I will discuss each in turn. 
First, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound, and others 
influentially theorized about the grounds of liability for industrial 
injury in the early twentieth century.78  They implied that intentional 
torts were largely a thing of the past and a vestigial remnant of an 
earlier time.79  At the time they wrote, interspousal immunity was in 
full swing and the notion of the white woman as the “angel in the 
house” was in force.80  Women were excluded from participation in 
                                                          
half of the twentieth century); see also Jennifer Wriggins, Genetics, I.Q., 
Determinism, and Torts: The Example of Discovery in Lead Exposure Litigation, 77 
B.U. L. REV. 1025, 1081 (1997) (arguing that court orders subjecting mothers of lead-
exposed children to nonconsensual IQ and psychological tests reflected 
deterministic, racist assumptions). 
 77. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 837 (describing the method of asking questions 
to identify the implications for women from certain rules and practices). 
 78. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 
467 (1897) (explaining that the torts of today involve injuries from railroads and 
factories while the existing law of torts comes from the “old days of isolated, 
ungeneralized wrongs, assaults, slanders, and the like”); see also ROSCOE POUND, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 85 (1922) (explaining that “civilized men” 
can assume no one will intentionally harm them, and that a society of civilized men is 
necessary for division of labor, but that “the savage must move stealthily, avoid the 
skyline and go armed”). 
 79. See Holmes, supra note 78, at 471-72 (proposing a change in the theory of 
torts law from the generally accepted view that the plaintiff must show a right for 
recovery to the view that damage should be actionable through the danger inherent 
in the act as manifested through common experience). 
 80. See, e.g., VIRGINIA WOOLF, WOMEN AND WRITING 59 (Michele Barrett ed., 
1979) (describing the “angel in the house” as a pure, sympathetic, charming, 
unselfish, woman who mastered the “difficult arts of family life[,] sacrificed herself 
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the legal system in all sorts of ways.  When ex-wives sued ex-husbands 
for torts committed during the marriage, courts urged them to 
“forgive and forget,” no matter how egregious the tort.81 
Largely in the last third of the twentieth century, interspousal 
immunity was gradually eviscerated.82  Spouses or ex-spouses are now 
free to sue each other for torts committed during marriage.83  
However, the overall focus of torts did not change.  Tort law and 
scholarship have continued to focus on accidental injury, ignoring the 
important fact that a wide range of injuries that were previously 
noncompensable, are now compensable.  The 1999 introduction to 
the discussion draft of the Third Restatement of Torts-General 
Principles, for example, states, “[t]he problem of accidental injury is 
what many see as the core problem facing modern tort law.”84  Law 
and economics scholarship, so influential in torts, sometimes defines 
“torts” as consisting of negligence and strict liability, leaving out 
intentional torts entirely, even from the definition of torts.85  When 
intentional torts are mentioned, they sometimes are grouped with 
criminal law or marginalized.86  Part of my project is to underscore 
the importance of intentional torts, to examine ways in which the 
torts system handles them, and to consider whether there might be 
better ways to handle them. 
                                                          
daily[,] . . . never had a mind or wish of her own,” and existed in every house). 
 81. See Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 305-09 (1877) (entering a nonsuit against 
the former wife where her ex-husband with friends forcibly kidnapped her and had 
her institutionalized in a mental institution).  See generally Siegel, supra note 34, at 
2119-20 (illustrating a variety of gender, class, and race-based concerns that shaped 
the regulation of marital violence during the Reconstruction Era, drawing into 
question the social meaning of chastisement’s demise). 
 82. See Carl Tobias, The Imminent Demise of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 60 
MONT. L. REV. 101, 101 (1999) (noting that only a few states retain any form of 
interspousal immunity); Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. 
L. REV. 359, 435 (1989) (postulating that the courts abandoned immunity because of 
refined public policy arguments and not legal arguments). 
 83. There continues to be suspicion of interspousal tort claims, especially those 
that do not involve physical injury.  See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 55-64 (2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES 
OF THE LAW] (discussing the difficulties of recognizing interspousal claims for 
emotional distress damages); Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal 
Emotional Abuse as a Tort?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1268, 1286-1342 (1996) (outlining reasons 
why courts should be “leery” of interspousal tort claims, especially those that do not 
involve physical injury). 
 84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 21 (Discussion Draft 
1999) (limiting the scope of a project reviewing general theories of torts to accidental 
personal injury and property damage). 
 85. See Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 9, at 182 n.370 
(comparing the treatment of intentional and accidental torts in a number of torts 
authorities). 
 86. See id. (describing  scholarship that categorizes intentional torts as crimes or 
otherwise treats intentional torts as somewhat tangential). 
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A second reason why tort law and scholarship can continue to 
ignore domestic violence is that there are so few reported tort cases 
pertaining to recovery for domestic violence injuries.  I reviewed 
thousands of cases on Westlaw in summer 2003 and found only thirty-
four tort cases dealing with domestic violence.87  Given the amount of 
domestic violence, which, while difficult to estimate is nonetheless 
substantial, compared with the number of domestic violence tort 
cases, it is clear that the number of cases is many times less than the 
amount of domestic violence.88  In terminology used in other areas of 
injury, the “claims rate” for domestic violence injury is low.89 
There are many reasons why the claims rate is so low.  First, statutes 
of limitation are shorter for many intentional torts than for 
negligence and other claims.90  Domestic violence tort claims by 
definition arise from an ongoing relationship so it is completely 
foreseeable that victims of domestic violence will be unable to satisfy 
short statutes of limitation. 
Second, insurance plays a key role, yet one often overlooked.  
Money judgments in tort cases generally come from insurance policies 
rather than the defendants’ pockets.91  If one is going to understand 
the way tort litigation works, it is essential to understand insurance.  
One insurance barrier is the intentional acts exclusion, which is 
universal in liability homeowners and automobile policies.92  It 
provides that if the insured intends an act, there is no coverage for the 
act or its consequences.  Since domestic violence torts are almost 
always intentional acts, it stands to reason that the intentional acts 
exclusion will mean that generally there is no coverage for domestic 
                                                          
 87. See Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence in First Year Torts, 54 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. NO. 4 (forthcoming) (manuscript at 6 n.9, on file with author) (cross-indexing 
the search terms of domestic violence, assault, and battery while conducting Westlaw 
searches).  The results showed a low rate of domestic violence torts claims in 
proportion to all other torts claims.  Id. 
 88. See id. at 6 (discussing that most torts claims are unintentional torts, and 
intentional torts claims are rarely addressed). 
 89. See id. (arguing that although a very small percentage of torts claims are 
intentional, an even smaller percentage of intentional torts claims arise from 
domestic violence, therefore little scholarship focuses on domestic violence claims). 
 90. See Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 9, at 139-40 (stating that 
the statutes of limitations for assault, battery, and false imprisonment often are one to 
two years and generally are shorter than for negligence). 
 91. See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort 
Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 275 (2001) (noting that most lawyers assume 
in their procedures that all money judgments in torts cases will come from insurance 
policies). 
 92. See Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 9, at 135-36 (explaining 
that if a plaintiff were to bring a claim for intentional torts against a homeowner with 
liability insurance, the insurance company would successfully dodge the claim by 
arguing that the insurance does not cover intentional torts). 
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violence torts. 
In addition, when interspousal immunity was eroding, liability 
insurance companies began to insert “family member exclusions” in 
their policies.93  These exclusions, now standard in homeowners and 
automobile policies, provide that the insurance policy will not cover 
the claim if a family member sues another family member for injury.  
Initially, tort doctrine and then insurance worked to bar people, 
mostly women, from recovering in tort. 
A third barrier to lawsuits for domestic violence torts is that most 
potential defendants lack available assets.94  Fourth, in some states, 
tort claims must be brought at the same time as divorce claims.95  
Additional barriers include a victim/survivor’s reasonable fear of 
retaliation or a desire to move forward, lawyer ignorance, or various 
other factors.96 
In short, tort law and scholarship largely ignore domestic violence 
for at least the following reasons: 1) there are few reported domestic 
violence tort cases, and 2) a powerful paradigm defines accidental 
injury as the central subject of torts, thus ruling out domestic violence 
cases.  Torts’ “primary goals” of “effective and efficient deterrence and 
compensation” are not being met with respect to domestic violence. 97  
This failure hurts all victims of domestic violence but particularly 
impacts women who comprise most of those who suffer the resulting 
physical injury.98 
                                                          
 93. Jennifer Wriggins, Interspousal Tort Immunity and Insurance “Family 
Member Exclusions”: Shared Assumptions, Relational and Liberal Feminist 
Challenges, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 251, 252-54 (2002) (considering these family 
member exclusions as a new form of interspousal tort immunity); see also Gerald D. 
Ashdown, Intrafamily Immunity, Pure Compensation, and the Family Exclusion 
Clause, 60 IOWA L. REV. 239, 239 (1974) (arguing that creating family exclusion 
clauses in insurance policies while creating legislation disallowing interspousal 
immunity is inconsistent and undesirable). 
 94. See Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 9, at 137-39 (providing an 
example of a house which may be jointly owned, mortgaged, protected by a 
homestead exemption, located in another state, or encumbered by preexisting 
involuntary liens by the victim and the perpetrator, thus complicating financial 
recovery against a defendant). 
 95. See id. at 140-41 (arguing that bringing tort claims together with divorce 
claims can put the plaintiff’s economic or physical survival, or relationship with 
children at risk); Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: 
Constraints and Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 363-64 (1997) (suggesting that 
the interplay between the tort claim and the divorce claim can strengthen or weaken 
either or both). 
 96. See Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 9, at 141-44 (examining 
other potential needs of the victim as more pressing than a lawsuit, such as caring for 
the children or escaping the spouse). 
 97. See Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 395. 
 98. See Dalton, supra note 95, at 321-22 n.2 (citing data that ninety percent of  
heterosexual partner violence reported to law enforcement authorities is committed 
by men); Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 9, at 123 n.4 (detailing how 
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2. Feminist Responses 
An overall feminist approach is to ask how we might encourage tort 
litigation to address domestic violence torts.  Our goals are several.  
We want to increase compensation for domestic violence injuries, and 
we can do that through litigation.  We want to deter domestic violence 
injuries, and we can do that through litigation.  Feminists have tried 
to encourage litigation in other areas, such as by enacting the civil 
remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act.99  Although 
empirical evidence of tort law’s deterrence is hazy, such deterrence is 
assumed to be an important goal of tort law and there is no reason 
why this should not be true in this area.100  There are several concrete 
strategies that may help reach these feminist goals. 
Such strategies include first, lengthening statutes of limitation for 
intentional torts so that victims/survivors have adequate time to bring 
claims.  Several states have done this already.101  The second reform is 
to make it clear that parties seeking a divorce do not have to assert 
their tort claims at the same time.102 
The third strategy involves insurance reform.  I propose that we 
have a mandatory system of liability insurance covering domestic 
violence tort injuries.103  The insurance would be part of automobile 
insurance so as to spread the costs of these injuries as broadly as 
possible.  Automobile insurance policies would not have an 
intentional acts exclusion for injuries caused by domestic violence.  
                                                          
women are far more likely to be victimized by an intimate partner than men). 
 99. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994) 
(guaranteeing all women the right to be free from crimes motivated by gender).  But 
see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 600-02 (2000) (holding that gender-
motivated crimes of violence were not considered economic activity and that 
Congress lacked the authority to enact § 13981 because the statute did not involve 
economic activity or interstate commerce under U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5). 
 100. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: 
Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 381-90 (1994) (reviewing tort law's 
effect on formal empirical studies, surveys of physicians and corporate managers, 
reports provided by journalists, and the author’s own interview inquiries and arguing 
that the strong form of the deterrence argument, though erroneous, supports the 
moderate argument that sector-by-sector tort law provides something significant by 
way of deterrence). 
 101. See Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 9, at 176 (describing 
California’s statute of limitations, which allows a case to be filed within three years of 
the event occurring or from the point upon which the plaintiff should have realized 
her injury). 
 102. See id. at 176-78 (arguing that victims should not have to litigate their tort 
claims at the same time as the divorce litigation as it can be perilous to do so, because 
family courts may not have the expertise to deal with tort claims, tort claims involve 
jury trials and family cases do not, and the risk of double recovery is minimal). 
 103. See id. at 152-69 (explaining how an insurance policy could cover injuries 
resulting from incidents of domestic violence, allowing those injured to seek recovery 
though a torts suit against the tortfeasor). 
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The policies would not have a family member exclusion.  In other 
words, harm caused by domestic violence would be covered by liability 
insurance.  It would have a provision, similar to uninsured motorist 
coverage, that would cover a person’s domestic violence injuries when 
inflicted by an uninsured person.  The justification for making the 
insurance mandatory is based on public policy and on data about risk 
assessment, and also echoes the reason why automobile insurance is 
mandatory.  Namely, the injuries caused by auto accidents are too 
many and too serious to simply rely on individuals’ decisions whether 
to insure or not; people may estimate their risk inaccurately and so 
buy insufficient insurance.104  In the area of intimate relationships, 
people also estimate the risk of failure with amazing inaccuracy.105  
The reasons for an intentional act exclusion do not withstand close 
scrutiny, as I have explained.106  Second, an uninsured domestic 
violence tortfeasor provision makes sense for the same reason that 
uninsured motorist insurance makes sense—so that a person can 
make a tort claim with her own insurance company for injury if she is 
injured by an uninsured domestic violence tortfeasor.  Uninsured 
motorist coverage was created in the 1930s and 1940s when there was 
a massive surge in injuries caused by drivers who lacked insurance.107  
Such coverage now is required in automobile policies in most 
states.108  Uninsured motorist coverage, notably, lacks an intentional 
acts exclusion.109  Courts analyze the application of the coverage from 
the perspective of the insured.110  For example, an act by an 
uninsured motorist ramming the insured motorist’s car may be 
                                                          
 104. See id. (explicating that, in insurance terms, mandatory insurance lowers the 
risk of adverse selection, which is the tendency of people who need insurance most to 
buy it, which can lead to too many claims, extremely expensive insurance, and market 
failure). 
 105. See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above 
Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993) (“[T]he median response of the marriage license 
applicants was zero percent when assessing the likelihood that they personally would 
divorce.”). 
 106. See Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 9, at 161-69 (arguing that 
justifications for intentional acts exclusion as supposedly necessitated by moral hazard 
and public policy are not compelling). 
 107. E.g., ALAN I. WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 4, 10 (1969) 
(describing development of uninsured motorist coverage in response to public outcry 
over an increase in injuries caused by automobile accidents in New York, where loss 
from uninsured drivers totaled about seven million dollars a year). 
 108. See id. at 12 (describing the uninsured motorist endorsement as an 
alternative to compulsory motor insurance). 
 109. See id. (limiting coverage to hit and run drivers or accidents with the 
uninsured, and lacking coverage for intentional acts committed by the uninsured). 
 110. See Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 9, at 153-54 (explaining 
that intentional damage by an uninsured motorist is covered, because the event is 
examined from the perspective of the victim, not the perpetrator). 
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intentional, but from the perspective of the insured, it is decidedly 
not intentional.111  Recovery under the injured person’s own policy is 
allowed.  This is one reason why uninsured motorist coverage holds 
promise as a model. 
If this plan is adopted, we can expect to see actions by insurance 
companies trying to reduce the incidence of domestic violence.  
Domestic violence may be seen as more of a societal issue than an 
individual issue and there may be more of a collective response than 
currently prevails.  While many may object to this approach, it has the 
advantage of spreading the costs of domestic violence more broadly 
and compensating more people for domestic violence injuries.  Such 
an approach should lead to more litigation and thus more deterrence. 
CONCLUSION 
Torts is ripe for gender-conscious and race-conscious revisions such 
as the one begun here.  Race and gender have affected the 
application of legal concepts such as duty, harm, and injury.  Tort 
cases have at times reinforced race and gender hierarchies and at 
times have undermined them.  Persistent paradigms and directions of 
inquiry, such as the dominant focus of torts on accidental injury, can 
be identified and challenged.  A rigorous rethinking of existing 
assumptions and directions may open up new avenues of exploration 
and possibilities for change. 
 
                                                          
 111. See id. 
